University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2016

The Knowledge Gap in Workplace Retirement Investing and the
Role of Professional Advisors
Jill E. Fisch
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Tess Wilkinson-Ryan
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Kristin Firth
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Behavioral Economics Commons, Finance Commons, Labor and Employment Law
Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Retirement Security Law Commons, and the Work, Economy
and Organizations Commons

Repository Citation
Fisch, Jill E.; Wilkinson-Ryan, Tess; and Firth, Kristin, "The Knowledge Gap in Workplace Retirement
Investing and the Role of Professional Advisors" (2016). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1590.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1590

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

FISCH, WILKINSON-RYAN & FIRTH IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/28/2016 7:19 PM

THE KNOWLEDGE GAP IN WORKPLACE
RETIREMENT INVESTING AND THE ROLE OF
PROFESSIONAL ADVISORS
JILL E. FISCH†
TESS WILKINSON-RYAN††
KRISTIN FIRTH†††
ABSTRACT
The dramatic shift from traditional pension plans to participantdirected 401(k) plans has increased the obligation of individual
investors to take responsibility for their own retirement planning. With
this shift comes increasing evidence that investors are making poor
investment decisions.
This Article seeks to uncover the reasons for poor investment
decisions. We use a simulated retirement investing task and a new
financial literacy index to evaluate the role of financial literacy in
retirement investment decisionmaking in a group of nonexpert
participants. Our results suggest that individual employees often lack
the skills necessary to support the current model of participant-directed
investing. We show that less knowledgeable participants allocate too
little money to equity, engage in naive diversification, fail to identify
dominated funds, and are inattentive to fees. Over the duration of a
retirement account, these mistakes can cost investors hundreds of
thousands of dollars.
We then explore the capacity of professional advisors to mitigate this
problem. Using the same study with a group of professional advisors,
we document a predictable but nonetheless dramatic knowledge gap
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between professionals and ordinary investors. The professional
advisors were far more financially literate and made better choices
among investment alternatives. Our results highlight the potential value
of professional advice in mitigating the effects of financial illiteracy in
retirement planning. Our findings suggest that, in weighing the costs of
heightened regulation against the value of reducing possible conflicts
of interest, regulators need to be sensitive to the knowledge gap.

INTRODUCTION
The workers of the next generation face a new challenge—saving
for their own retirement. In the past, workers were able to rely on a
combination of employer-provided pensions, also known as definedbenefit plans, and social security. Today the vast majority of workers
will have to depend on the balances in their 401(k) plans and individual
retirement accounts (IRAs)—plans in which they are individually
responsible for choosing both how much money to save for retirement
and how to allocate that money among a range of investment options.
Participant-directed retirement-savings plans may increase employee
autonomy and reduce the potential that employees will be the victim
of pension-plan underfunding or employer conflicts of interest. There
are reasons to think, however, that the task is so complex that most
retail investors make predictable and systematic mistakes at a real cost
to their financial well-being.1 Indeed, commentators report that the
shift to employee-directed retirement savings has resulted in “the
greatest retirement crisis in history” in which many elderly Americans
will have insufficient retirement savings to meet their needs.2
Solutions to these problems are highly contested. One possible
response is improved disclosure—the dominant approach to investor
protection reflected in the federal securities laws.3 Yet it is unclear
1. See, e.g., JODI DICENZO, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 301
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND RETIREMENT PLAN CONTRIBUTIONS: HOW PARTICIPANTS
BEHAVE, AND PRESCRIPTIVE SOLUTIONS 7 (2007) (“Optimal retirement saving and investing are
complex tasks that may easily exceed boundaries of rational capability.”); Jill E. Fisch & Tess
Wilkinson-Ryan, Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly Mistakes? An Experiment on Mutual Fund
Choice, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 605, 643–44 (2014) (finding that investors pay limited attention to fees
and engage in naive diversification).
2. Edward Siedle, The Greatest Retirement Crisis in American History, FORBES
(Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/edwardsiedle/2013/03/20/the-greatest-retirementcrisis-in-american-history [https://perma.cc/KY8Y-65AE].
3. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 417–18 (2003) (“A demanding
system of mandatory disclosure, which has become more demanding in the aftermath of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, makes up the core of the federal securities laws.”). The U.S.
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whether disclosure is useful to investors who do not understand the
task at hand or the material they must evaluate. Some commentators
have called for more investor education to increase financial literacy
and, indeed, a variety of organizations are focusing their efforts on
investor education.4 To date, however, studies have found that investor
education has limited value in improving investing performance.5
Another option is more extensive regulation. The Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Tibble v. Edison International,6 which
imposed a continuing duty on the part of employers to monitor and
improve the investment options they offer in 401(k) plans, is an
example.7 The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) took a similar
approach in adopting its 2016 fiduciary rule, which mandates greater
compliance obligations for those who provide investment advice in
connection with retirement plans.8
Retirement investing presents particular regulatory challenges
because the core principles are themselves contested.9 Commentators
do not agree on the appropriate amount of retirement savings,10 the
acceptable degree of risk for a retirement portfolio,11 or the return that
workers should expect to earn over the course of their lifetimes.12

Department of Labor (DOL) has also emphasized increased disclosure. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, Fact Sheet: Final Rule to Improve Transparency of Fees and Expenses to Workers in
401(k)-Type Retirement Plans (Feb. 2012), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/fsparticipantfeerule.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A54A-VXWZ].
4. See infra notes 46–51 and accompanying text (describing these efforts).
5. See infra note 52 (citing studies).
6. Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823 (2015).
7. Id. at 1828.
8. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 6, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 2509, 2510, 2550).
9. See, e.g., J.J. Zhang & Daniel Zolin, Is There a Case for Actively Managed Funds?, WALL
STREET J. (Mar. 1, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/are-index-funds-really-better-than-actively
-managed-1425271058 [https://perma.cc/543B-PLGR] (presenting arguments on both sides of the
debate over actively managed versus index funds).
10. See, e.g., Tom Anderson, How Much Do You Really Need for Retirement?, CNBC (Sept.
21, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/21/how-much-do-you-really-need-for-retirement.html
[https://perma.cc/PP8A-UUPR] (reporting varying perspectives as to an appropriate retirementsavings target).
11. See, e.g., Daniel Gardner & Kevin Knowles, The Date Debate Revisited: Evidence
Continues to Support a Flat Glide Path in Retirement, RUSSELL INVS. (May 2015),
https://russellinvestments.com/us/insights/articles/the-date-debate-revisited [https://perma.cc/77
VJ-UEQ8] (recounting debate within the investment community about the appropriate asset
allocation of target-date funds at the target retirement date).
12. See Carla Fried, That Retirement Calculator May Be Lying to You, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3,
2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-10-03/that-retirement-calculator-may-be-

FISCH, WILKINSON-RYAN & FIRTH IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/28/2016 7:19 PM

636

[Vol. 66:633

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

Economic fluctuations can change the relative payoffs of different
investment choices, and financial innovation continues to produce new
and complex products for investors to evaluate.13 Scholars debate the
effectiveness of market forces in disciplining the fees associated with
professional advice.14 At the same time, a particular employee’s needs
may be driven by individualized factors.15 In light of these challenges,
it is difficult to set appropriate objectives for workplace financial
literacy, to determine what type of guidance to provide to workers, or
even to evaluate the quality of an individual worker or retirement
plan’s investment choices.16
A necessary first step for addressing these challenges is
understanding the process better. Specifically, it is necessary to identify
the particular mistakes that ordinary investors make and why they
make those mistakes.17 To analyze these questions, we construct and
apply a new financial literacy index, using questions tailored to the task
of choosing among investment options in an employer-sponsored
retirement plan. We consider the role of financial literacy in addition
to standard demographic characteristics, investor numeracy, and risk
aversion.
Our study supports the critical explanatory power of financial
literacy reported by other work in this field. Financial literacy,
measured through our index, is the strongest predictor of investment
decisionmaking measured across multiple dimensions. Although age,
gender, education, and investing experience are all highly correlated,

lying-to-you [https://perma.cc/3ZHD-SHA2] (citing a “wide range” of predicted return estimates
used in retirement planning).
13. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. 1961, 2022 (2010) (explaining the complexities of target-date funds).
14. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at 26–27, Jones
v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2009) (No. 08-586) (citing studies showing lack of market
discipline for mutual fund advisory fees). But see Brief for the Investment Company Institute as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 27–28, Jones, 130 S. Ct. 1418 (No. 08-586) (citing
evidence that mutual fund investors are highly responsive to advisory fees).
15. Anderson, supra note 10.
16. See, e.g., Dodge & Cox, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on the Definition of the
Term “Fiduciary” (July 17, 2015), https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210-ZA25-00068.pdf [https://
perma.cc/395P-PUC9] (criticizing the proposed rule for its preference for low-cost index funds
and observing that “mutual funds with the lowest fees do not necessarily represent the highest
quality investments for retirement investors”).
17. Our work addresses some of the questions raised by our earlier research, which
documented costly mistakes made by investors in retirement planning. See generally Fisch &
Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 1 (reporting results of an earlier study). The study described in this
Article demonstrates the connection between these mistakes and financial literacy.
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financial literacy is a strong predictor of returns even holding these
demographic variables constant. That is, financial literacy matters even
within demographic categories. Men or women, young or old, people
make better retirement investment choices when they know something
about the options available to them—including what an index fund is,
what a bond fund is, and which investments are associated with higher
or lower risk and returns.
By drilling down into the decisionmaking process, our study sheds
new light on the reasons why ordinary investors make costly mistakes.
We show that financially illiterate investors allocate too little money to
equity, engage in naive diversification, fail to identify dominated
funds,18 and are inattentive to fees. These mistakes can be costly.19 For
example, merely investing $10,000 in an equity fund with a 2 percent
instead of a 1 percent expense ratio will cost an investor a difference of
$28,000 over a thirty-year investment.
One method of addressing these limitations is through the
assistance of professional advisors. In the retirement industry,
professional advisors serve a variety of functions: they advise
businesses on how to set up appropriate 401(k) plans, they provide
investor education to employees eligible to participate in such plans,
and they provide advice to retail investors outside the employment
context such as regarding IRAs.20 Although the issues of high advisory
fees and conflicts of interest have generated extensive controversy
about the role and incentives of professional advisors,21 research has
18. We draw upon the concept of dominated funds developed in Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis,
Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of Excessive Fees and “Dominated Funds” in
401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. 1346 (2015) (explaining the concept of dominated funds in 401(k)
plans). Ayres and Curtis define dominated funds as “choices in the plan menu that have an
optimal portfolio weight of less than 1% and that are more than fifty basis points more expensive
than either (i) funds in the same style offered in the menu or (ii) an average of similarly styled
funds in the marketplace.” Id. at 1481. We use a simplified approach to dominated funds here.
See infra Part III.B.2.
19. See, e.g., Anne Tergesen, 401(k) Fees, Already Low, Are Heading Lower, WALL
STREET J. (May 15, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/401-k-fees-already-low-are-headinglower-1463304601 [https://perma.cc/D82Y-L5MM] (reporting that “[a]ccording to Vanguard
Group, investors in a plan that charged 0.25% a year could in theory amass 20% more money
over a four-decade career than they could in one that charged 1.25%, all else being equal”).
20. OLIVER WYMAN, INC., THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL ADVISORS IN THE U.S. RETIREMENT
MARKET (2015), http://fsroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/The-role-of-financialadvisors-in-the-US-retirement-market-Oliver-Wyman.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4P4-L32W].
21. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE EFFECTS OF
CONFLICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE ON RETIREMENT SAVINGS (2015) (explaining that “advisers’
conflicts of interest are quantitatively significant and erode households’ retirement assets by
billions of dollars each year”).
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not addressed the threshold question—whether investment
professionals can in fact improve the quality of retirement planning.
In this Article, we address the capacity of professional advisors to
mitigate the problem of poor financial literacy. With the assistance of
the Financial Industry Regulatory Association (FINRA),22 we enlisted
a group of professional advisors to participate in our study. Our results
document a predictable but nonetheless dramatic knowledge gap
between professionals and ordinary investors at a basic level of
understanding. The professional advisors were overwhelmingly more
financially literate than even the more literate ordinary investors.
Similarly, the professional advisors performed better across a variety
of dimensions at the task of choosing among investment alternatives.
The reasons the professional advisors performed better are
particularly important. Professional advisors, unlike ordinary
investors, recognized that appropriate asset allocation was a key
component of retirement investing, understood the importance of
allocating money to equities over a long-term investment horizon, and,
to a large degree, correctly identified and rejected inferior investment
options.
Our results identify a potential value of professional advice in
mitigating the effects of financial illiteracy in retirement planning. As
a result, our study has important implications for regulation of
retirement investing and, in particular, the DOL’s 2016 fiduciary rule.23
Our findings suggest the need for regulators to be sensitive to the
knowledge gap in weighing the costs of heightened regulation against
the value of reducing possible conflicts of interest.
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides a brief overview
of the background literature on financial literacy and the regulatory
context to which our study is directed. Part II describes our study’s
structure and the construct of our financial literacy index. Part III
reports our findings about the role of financial literacy in investor
decisionmaking. Part IV considers the implications of our findings and
documents the potential value to retail investors of receiving access to
professional investment advice.
22. FINRA is a nongovernmental self-regulatory organization that oversees the brokerage
industry. FINRA, About FINRA, http://www.finra.org/about [https://perma.cc/77F3-TGFS]. As
of September, 2016, FINRA regulated approximately 3,895 securities firms with approximately
641,761 brokers. http://finra.org/newsroom/statistics [https://perma.cc/34N7-N543].
23. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 6, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 2509, 2510, 2550). For
an explanation of the 2016 fiduciary rule, see infra notes 76–83 and accompanying text.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Role of Financial Literacy
An extensive body of research reports that consumers lack basic
financial literacy.24 At the outset, as scholars concede, this observation
is overly simplistic in that financial literacy can be defined in various
ways.25 As one paper has observed, many definitions incorporate both
knowledge of financial concepts and the skills necessary to apply that
knowledge to the task at hand.26 Evaluating financial literacy may also
be context specific: the necessary skills and knowledge vary according
to the task. This Article examines financial literacy in the context of
investment decisionmaking, and in particular its role in retirement
planning.
Annamaria Lusardi and Olivia Mitchell have conducted the most
extensive and best-known research on financial literacy. Most of their
work uses a financial literacy assessment instrument consisting of three
questions.27 Lusardi and Mitchell, working together and with others,
have incorporated these three questions into a large number of surveys

24. E.g., Editorial, Improving Financial Literacy Is Essential to Our Nation’s Economic
Health, TIME (Apr. 9, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/04/09/op-ed-improving-financialliteracy-is-essential-to-our-nations-economic-health [https://perma.cc/Z978-HNXX].
25. See, e.g., Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, The Economic Importance of Financial
Literacy: Theory and Evidence, 52 J. ECON. LITERATURE 5, 6 (2014) [hereinafter Lusardi &
Mitchell, Economic Importance] (defining financial literacy as “peoples’ ability to process
economic information and make informed decisions about financial planning, wealth
accumulation, debt, and pensions”).
26. See Angela A. Hung, Andrew M. Parker & Joanne K. Yoong, Defining and Measuring
Financial Literacy, (RAND Labor and Population Working Paper Series, WR-708, 2009),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1498674 [https://perma.cc/829P-8CNC].
27. See, e.g., Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Planning:
Implications for Retirement Wellbeing, in FINANCIAL LITERACY: IMPLICATIONS FOR
RETIREMENT SECURITY AND THE FINANCIAL MARKETPLACE 17, 39 (2012) [hereinafter Lusardi
& Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Planning]; Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Planning
and Financial Literacy: How Do Women Fare?, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 413, 413–14 (2008)
[hereinafter Lusardi & Mitchell, How Do Women Fare?]. The questions are:
• Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per year. After 5
years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to grow:
[more than $102, exactly $102, less than $102? Do not know; refuse to answer].
• Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation was
2% per year. After 1 year, would you be able to buy: [more than, exactly the same as, or less
than today with the money in this account? Do not know; refuse to answer].
• Do you think that the following statement is true or false? “Buying a single company stock
usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund.” [True, false, do not know; refuse
to answer].
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in the United States and throughout the world.28 Their bottom-line
conclusion is that “financial literacy can play a key role on both saving
and portfolio choice.”29
The Lusardi and Mitchell test has been highly influential. They
and other scholars added to the three basic questions in some cases.30
Other scholars have introduced their own measures of financial
literacy.31 A common finding among the extensive literature is that
levels of financial literacy are low.32
Commentators cite research linking low financial literacy to a
wide variety of costly financial mistakes, including the failure to save
adequately, the use of expensive sources of credit, and the failure to
obtain and use information about various financial products.33 For
example, Lusardi and Mitchell found that women who exhibit lower

28. Lusardi & Mitchell, Economic Importance, supra note 25, at 10 (describing the use of
these three questions in various surveys).
29. Lusardi & Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Planning, supra note 27, at 35.
30. See, e.g., Jere R. Behrman, Olivia S. Mitchell, Cindy K. Soo & David Bravo, How
Financial Literacy Affects Household Wealth Accumulation, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 300, 301 (2012)
(using a “rich set of 12 questions” to study financial literacy in Chile); Maarten C.J. van Rooij,
Annamaria Lusardi & Rob J.M. Alessie, Financial Literacy, Retirement Planning and Household
Wealth, 122 ECON. J. 449 (2012) [hereinafter van Rooij et al., Household Wealth] (using a fivefactor test); Maarten C.J. van Rooij, Annamaria Lusardi, & Rob Alessie, Financial Literacy and
Stock Market Participation, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 449 (2011) [hereinafter van Rooij et al., Stock
Market Participation] (also using a five-factor test); see also Antonia Grohmann, Roy
Kouwenberg and Lukas Menkhoff, Financial Literacy and Its Consequences in the Emerging
Middle Class (Kiel Inst. for the World Econ. Working Papers, No. 1943, 2014), https://www.ifwmembers.ifw-kiel.de/publications/financial-literacy-and-its-consequences-in-the-emerging-midd
le-class/KWP%201943.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2Q6-CWEK] (using a three-question test to
measure financial literacy in Bangkok but adding a fourth question asking subjects to name
foreign banks that operate in Thailand).
31. See, e.g., Daniel Fernandes, John G. Lynch, Jr. & Richard G. Netemeyer, The Effect of
Financial Literacy and Financial Education on Downstream Financial Behaviors, 60 MGMT. SCI.
1861 (2014) (challenging previous measures of financial literacy and substituting its own thirteenquestion scale); Marianne A. Hilgert, Jeanne M. Hogarth, and Sondra G. Beverly, Household
Financial Management: The Connection Between Knowledge and Behavior, FED. RES. BULL. 309
(2003), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2003/0703lead.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QNYDX5A] (using twenty-eight pass–fail questions); Sebastian Müller & Martin Weber, Financial
Literacy and Mutual Fund Investments: Who Buys Actively Managed Funds?, 62 SCHMALENBACH
BUS. REV. 126, 128 (2010) (using an eight-question quiz). See generally Hung et al., supra note 26,
at tbl.2 (listing studies measuring financial literacy and describing structure of assessment and
number of questions asked).
32. See, e.g., Lusardi & Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Planning, supra note 27, at 34
(reporting “widespread financial illiteracy among older Americans”).
33. See William Gale & Ruth Levine, Financial Literacy: What Works? How Could It Be
More Effective, 72 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 39, 40 (2012) (describing some of the “abundant
evidence” relating financial literacy to financial mistakes).
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levels of financial literacy are less likely to plan for retirement.34
Behrman and others found that financial literacy was positively
correlated with household wealth and that the effects of literacy were
“more important than schooling for explaining variation in household
wealth and pension contributions.”35 Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie
found those with lower levels of financial literacy are less likely to
invest in stocks.36
Regulators have also researched financial literacy. FINRA’s
Investor Education Foundation attempted to measure financial
literacy through a five-question study—the National Financial
Capability Study—which is simply the Lusardi five-question survey.37
Of the five multiple-choice questions, which address compounding,
inflation, mortgages, diversification, and the relationship between
interest rates and bond prices, FINRA’s subjects answered an average
of 2.88 questions correctly.38 From these results, FINRA concluded,
“Americans demonstrate relatively low levels of financial literacy and
have difficulty applying financial decisionmaking skills to real life
situations.”39
The Dodd-Frank Act40 directed the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to examine investor financial literacy,41 and the
SEC reported its results in a report in 2012.42 The report relied upon a
review of existing quantitative studies of financial literacy conducted
by the Library of Congress43 as well as online testing of investor
understanding of various SEC-mandated disclosure documents.44 The

34. Lusardi & Mitchell, How Do Women Fare?, supra note 27, at 415–16.
35. Behrman et al., supra note 30, at 303.
36. van Rooij et al., Stock Market Participation, supra note 30, at 450.
37. FINRA INV’R EDUC. FOUND., Take the Financial Literacy Quiz, http://www.usfinancial
capability.org/quiz.php [https://perma.cc/QZ7U-JVC6].
38. See Kimberly Palmer, How to Measure Your Financial Literacy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP.: MONEY (June 20, 2014, 9:23 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/alpha-consumer/
2014/06/20/how-to-measure-your-financial-literacy [https://perma.cc/PJH3-JWA4] (using these
questions to describe results of FINRA’s survey of 25,000 adults in 2009 and 2012).
39. See FINRA INV’R EDUC. FOUND., U.S. Survey Data at a Glance, http://www.usfinancial
capability.org/results.php?region=US [https://perma.cc/G93U-TR8W] (reporting survey results).
40. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered titles of the U.S. Code).
41. Id. § 917.
42. SEC, Study Regarding Financial Literacy Among Investors (2012), https://www.sec.gov/
news/studies/2012/917-financial-literacy-study-part1.pdf [https://perma.cc/LRS2-PM25].
43. Id. at vii.
44. Id. at ix.
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SEC, like FINRA, concluded, “American investors lack basic financial
literacy.”45
Scholars and policymakers are attempting to respond to evidence
of poor consumer investment decisions by improving consumer
financial education.46 For example, the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) has identified as one of its objectives developing tools
for more effective investor education.47 Similarly, on June 25, 2013,
President Obama signed an executive order establishing the
President’s Advisory Council on Financial Capability for Young
Americans.48 The Council, led by the U.S. Treasury Department,
evaluates the financial capability of young people and develops tools
to improve their capabilities.49 The Schwab Foundation, under the
leadership of Carrie Schwab-Pomerantz, has worked to develop
investor-education programs for more than thirty years.50 As SchwabPomerantz explains: “[F]inancial education can change lives.”51
For investor education to improve financial decisionmaking,
however, two things must be true. First, a lack of financial literacy must
be a contributing cause of poor investor decisions. Second, investor
education must be effective in improving financial literacy. This Article
focuses primarily on the first question; our future work will focus on
the second.52

45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Gale & Levine, supra note 33.
47. See Richard Cordray, Dir. of the Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Address at the
FINRA Investor Education Conference (May 29, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
newsroom/director-cordray-remarks-at-the-finra-investor-education-conference [https://perma.
cc/Z2XN-DDHZ] (describing the CFPB’s investor education efforts).
48. Exec. Order No. 13,646, 3 C.F.R. 308 (2014).
49. Cyrus Amir-Mokri, President Obama Creates New Advisory Council Focused on the
Financial Capability of Young Americans, TREASURY NOTES (June 25, 2013), http://www.
treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/President-Obama-Creates-New-Advisory-Council-Focused-onthe-Financial-Capability-of-Young-Americans.aspx [https://perma.cc/H536-U7S5].
50. Carrie Schwab-Pomerantz, CHARLES SCHWAB, http://www.schwab.com/public/schwab/
resource_center/expert_insight/schwab_experts/carrie_schwab_pomerantz.html [https://perma.
cc/9JQD-A5FP].
51. Andrew S. Ross, Schwab-Pomerantz: Visionary Wants Financial Security for All,
SFGATE (Feb. 26, 2015, 5:16 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/visionsf/article/Schwab-PomerantzVisionary-wants-financial-6039360.php [https://perma.cc/V5B9-YH3A].
52. To date, studies have questioned the effectiveness of investor education in addressing
poor financial literacy. See, e.g., Fernandes et al., supra note 31, at 1872 (conducting meta-analysis
of 168 papers on financial education and finding that “financial education interventions studied
explained only about 0.1% of the variance in the financial behaviors studied, with even weaker
average effects of interventions directed at low-income rather than general population samples”);
Lewis Mandell & Linda Schmid Klein, The Impact of Financial Literacy Education on Subsequent
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B. Financial Literacy, Regulation, and Retirement Investing
The role of financial literacy is particularly important in the
context of retirement savings.53 Over the past forty years, retirementsavings plans have shifted almost entirely from employer-directed
plans to those in which individual workers make their own savings and
investment decisions.54 This shift has resulted in many workers lacking
sufficient savings at the time of retirement. Critics attribute the
problem, in part, to poor decisions by plan participants and by those
employees who choose not to participate at all.55 Studies suggest that
participants in workplace retirement plans make numerous mistakes,
including saving too little,56 choosing suboptimal investment options,57
and paying excessive fees.58 Understanding the contribution of
financial literacy to poor investment decisions is critical to the policy
choices around whether and how to regulate.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
regulates most employee benefit plans, including employer-provided
retirement plans.59 ERISA’s mandates are implemented primarily by

Financial Behavior, 20 J. FIN. COUNSELING & PLAN. 15, 18 (2009) (finding high-school financial
education course did not improve financial behavior); Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial Literacy
Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 201 (2008) (arguing that financial education is too costly and
thus not an effective tool for improving the average American’s financial decsionmaking).
53. See generally Lusardi & Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Planning, supra note 27
(studying financial literacy among older Americans and its implications for retirement planning).
54. Fisch & Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 1, at 614.
55. See, e.g., Jeff Rose, 4 Serious Retirement Plan Errors to Avoid, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP.: MONEY (Mar. 9, 2015, 10:08 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/onretirement/2015/03/09/4-serious-retirement-plan-errors-to-avoid [https://perma.cc/Y6K3-3VSC].
56. See James J. Choi, David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, $100 Bills on the Sidewalk:
Suboptimal Investment in 401(k) Plans, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 748, 760–61 (2011).
57. See Nina Tang, Olivia S. Mitchell, Gary R. Mottola & Stephen P. Utkus, The Efficiency
of Sponsor and Participant Portfolio Choices in 401(k) Plans, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 1073, 1073–74
(2010) (finding that investors construct inefficient portfolios, reducing their potential retirement
wealth by one fifth); ALICIA A. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUNDEN, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT
BOSTON COLL., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 43, 401(K) PLANS ARE STILL COMING UP SHORT
4–5 (2006), http://crr.bc.edu/briefs/401k-plans-are-still-coming-up-short [https://perma.cc/VX47GNAH] (outlining various poor investment decisions, including failure to diversify, an
overinvestment in company stock, and a failure to rebalance).
58. Josh Boak & Paul Wiseman, High Fees Eroding Many 401(k) Retirement Accounts,
ASSOCIATED PRESS: THE BIG STORY (Sept. 13, 2014, 1:37 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/
savers-beware-fees-may-be-shrinking-your-401k [https://perma.cc/M3LL-S3SM].
59. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 80
Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C).
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the DOL.60 Regulation of retirement investing reflects a tension
between two policy objectives. On the one hand, the DOL has
attempted to address deficiencies in the structure of retirement plans
and in employee use of such plans by imposing mandatory
requirements on plans and plan providers.61 On the other hand, wary
perhaps of the pitfalls of mandating a specific retirement strategy or
product, the regulations privilege investor autonomy.62
The law recognizes the critical role that employers and other
intermediaries play in retirement investing. Specifically, ERISA is
structured around the concept of a fiduciary.63 Under ERISA, a person
becomes a fiduciary by giving investment advice, exercising
discretionary authority over the management of a retirement plan,
exercising control over plan assets, or having discretionary authority
over a plan’s administration.64 A person can also become a fiduciary by
providing investment advice for a fee.65
Under ERISA, fiduciaries are subject to strict regulation,
including mandated legal obligations, transaction restrictions, and
liability exposure.66 Employers who might otherwise be subject to this

60. See Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans
Today: Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 4 (2000) (“[T]he Department of
Labor . . . interpret[s] and appl[ies] ERISA’s statutory provisions.”).
61. For example, employers have obligations to construct plans consisting of an appropriate
mix of investment alternatives, to administer the plan properly, to make a variety of disclosures,
including disclosure of fee information, and to avoid conflicts of interest. See, e.g., LaRue v.
DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 256 (2008) (recognizing potential employer liability for
“fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a participant’s individual account”);
Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 746 F.3d 327, 336 (8th Cir. 2014) (imposing liability on plan fiduciaries for
allowing the plan to pay excessive recordkeeping fees); Scott Mayland, Note, Ratcheting Up the
Duty: The Department of Labor’s Misguided Attempt to Impose a Paternalistic Model upon
Defined Contribution Plans Through ERISA, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 645, 646 (2014) (criticizing the
paternalism imposed through DOL’s fiduciary duty approach). See generally Anne Tucker,
Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the Defined Contribution Society, 51 HOUS. L. REV.
153 (2013) (describing employer obligations under ERISA).
62. See, e.g., Dana M. Muir, Choice Architecture and the Locus of Fiduciary Obligation in
Defined Contribution Plans, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1, 14–16 (2013) (explaining how both the decision
to participate and the choice among investment alternatives have been regarded as employee
decisions by both regulators and commentators); see also Fisch & Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 1,
at 618 (observing that courts have frequently accepted alleged deficiencies among investment
options so long as plan offered participants a sufficient number of alternatives).
63. See Medill, supra note 60, at 27 (“ERISA’s statutory scheme is built around the concept
of a ‘fiduciary.’”).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i), (iii) (2012).
65. Id. § 1002(21)(A)(ii).
66. Among other things, ERISA prohibits fiduciaries from all conflicts of interest absent an
explicit exemption. ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). This standard has come to be
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standard can limit the scope of their fiduciary obligations, however, if
they delegate investment responsibility to plan participants in
accordance with the DOL’s requirements.67 Specifically, an employer
is relieved of fiduciary responsibility for investment losses experienced
by its employees if the plan participants exercise independent control
over their investment decisions.68
Notably, the 404(c) regulations do not limit the employer’s
obligation to construct an appropriate plan. In Tibble, the Supreme
Court held that ERISA fiduciaries have a continuing duty to monitor
the quality of the investment options offered in their 401(k) plans and
must remove imprudent options from the plan.69 Although the decision
was narrow and did not specify the scope of this monitoring function,
it focused increased attention on the important role played by plan
fiduciaries.70
ERISA permits employers and other advisors to provide investor
education but draws a strict distinction between education and
investment advice: provision of the latter subjects the provider to
fiduciary obligations. The line between the two is unclear.71 Previously,
ERISA created a substantial risk that investor education would be
treated as the provision of investment advice and subject employers to
fiduciary obligations, leading employers to refrain from any effort to
educate plan participants.72 The Pension Protection Act of 2006
known as ERISA’s exclusive benefit rule. See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s
Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1108 (1988).
67. DOL regulations provide that in a plan that “provides for individual accounts and
permits a participant . . . to exercise control over the assets in his account, if a
participant . . . exercises control over the assets . . . no person who is otherwise a fiduciary shall
be liable under this part for any loss . . . which results from such participant’s . . . exercise of
control.” See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (2015). These provisions are known as the 404(c)
regulations. To qualify for this protection, the plan must provide that the employees exercise
control, have sufficient information to make informed investment decisions, and have access to
“a broad range of investment alternatives.” Id. Employers, however, are treated as fiduciaries if
they provide their employees with investment advice. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(ii).
68. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
69. Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1828 (2015).
70. Blaine F. Aikin, Ramifications of Supreme Court Decision on 401(k) Fee Lawsuit Run
Deep,
INV.
NEWS:
FIDUCIARY
CORNER
(June
1,
2015,
10:43
AM),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20150601/FREE/150609998/ramifications-of-supremecourt-decision-on-401-k-fee-lawsuit-run-deep [https://perma.cc/NDH7-W3UQ].
71. See Mayland, supra note 61, at 670 (explaining that, even after the PPA, “the line
between the provision of advice and education is still not clear”).
72. See, e.g., Medill, supra note 60, at 46 (explaining employer reluctance to provide investor
education as a product of DOL policy); Dana M. Muir, The Dichotomy Between Investment
Advice and Investment Education: Is No Advice Really the Best Advice?, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. &

FISCH, WILKINSON-RYAN & FIRTH IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/28/2016 7:19 PM

646

[Vol. 66:633

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

responded to this problem by creating an explicit exemption designed
to encourage educational programs.73 Some commentators have
argued that the statute should go further and impose an affirmative
obligation on employers to provide investor education.74 Employees
would likely be receptive: one recent study reported, “89 percent of
employees want their employer to make personal financial planning
advice available.”75
On April 6, 2016, the DOL released its long-awaited fiduciary
76
rule. The rule was adopted in response to ongoing criticism of the high
cost of conflicts of interest by those who provide investment advice in
connection with retirement plans.77 It responds by heightening the
LAB. L. 1, 21 (2002) (observing that an employer that provides too much information may be
deemed to have provided investment advice).
73. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1108(g) (2012); I.R.C. § 4975 (2012); Pension Protection Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.);
29 C.F.R. § 2550.408(g)-1 (2015); Regina T. Jefferson, Increasing Coverage in Today’s Private
Retirement System, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 463, 483 (2014). Prior to the enactment of the PPA,
Congress and the DOL engaged in several other initiatives designed to increase investor
education. See Medill, supra note 60, at 50–51 (describing and critiquing these initiatives).
74. See, e.g., Jefferson, supra note 73, at 483–44 (proposing a mandatory education
requirement for all employers that sponsor 401(k) plans).
75. 401k Trends: Employers Respond to Workers’ Desire for Advice, Personalized Education,
Improved Plans, 401khelpcenter.com, http://www.401khelpcenter.com/401k_education/trends_
education_and_investment_advice.html [https://perma.cc/8T9L-Q7DB] (citing CIGNA study).
76. See supra note 8. Congress required the SEC to study the effectiveness of the regulations
governing brokers and investment advisors as part of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913, 124 Stat. 1376,
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.). The statute authorized
the SEC to adopt a fiduciary standard for brokers. Id. The SEC staff conducted a study and, in
2011, released a recommendation that the agency adopt a unified fiduciary standard applicable to
both brokers and investment advisors. STAFF OF THE U.S. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON
INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 110–28 (2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SZR-QDEW]. To date, the SEC has failed to
adopt a fiduciary standard. See, e.g., Justin Baer & Andrew Ackerman, SEC Head Backs
Fiduciary Standards for Brokers, Advisers, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 17, 2015, 4:59 PM), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/sec-head-seeks-uniformity-in-fiduciary-duties-among-brokers-advisers-1426607
955 [https://perma.cc/3ERE-CDSV] (reporting that action on adopting a fiduciary standard at the
SEC has “stalled” “in part because of the complexity of the law”).
77. In February 2015, the White House Council of Economic Advisers released an analysis
reporting that conflicted advice from brokers costs investors $17 billion per year. COUNCIL OF
ECON. ADVISERS, THE EFFECTS OF CONFLICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE ON RETIREMENT
SAVINGS 26 (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cea_coi_report_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HFM7-NWVD]. President Obama responded by calling upon the DOL to move
forward with a rulemaking proposal that would heighten the regulatory restrictions imposed on
brokers who provide advice in connection with retirement investing, citing the need for
retirement advisors to “put the best interests of their clients above their own financial interests.”
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Fact Sheet: Department of Labor Proposes Rule to Address Conflicts of
Interest in Retirement Advice, Saving Middle-Class Families Billions of Dollars Every Year, http://
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regulatory obligations of those advisors.78 The rule classifies anyone
who provides investment advice for a fee in connection with a
retirement plan as a fiduciary. As a fiduciary, an advisor must meet
designated compliance requirements and is prohibited from engaging
in specified transactions or using designated fee structures.79 Although
the final rule has been described as substantially “watered down” from
a prior proposal that had been heavily criticized,80 the new regulatory
requirements will increase the cost of professional advice by making
compliance more burdensome and imposing greater liability risk. This
increased cost may, in turn, reduce access by ordinary investors to
professional advice in connection with retirement planning.81
Critics expressed particular concern about the potential effect of
the fiduciary rule on the provision of investor education. The DOL
designed its response to protect employers that offer investor
education programs. In addition to containing an extensive discussion
of investor education—which, pursuant to the rule, does not constitute

www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsconflictsofinterest.html [https://perma.cc/UPE2-78VG] (quoting
Feb. 23, 2015 statement by President Obama).
78. Employee Benefits Security Administration, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550).
79. Advisors can engage in certain prohibited transactions if they comply with the
requirements of the Best Interest Contract Exemption. 29 C.F.R. § 2550 (2015).
80. See Ashlea Ebeling, DOL Issues Final Fiduciary Rule, Does It Fall Short?, FORBES
(Apr. 7, 2016, 4:28 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2016/04/07/dol-issues-finalfiduciary-rule-does-it-fall-short/#5ad0928c548e [https://perma.cc/QEU7-HGAV].
81. See Tara Siegel Bernard, ‘Customers First’ to Become the Law in Retirement
Investing, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/your-money/new-rules
-for-retirement-accounts-financial-advisers.html [https://perma.cc/9NNC-87EE] (quoting Jules
Gaudreau, president of the National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors, as
expressing concern that “such a complex rule will result in higher costs and reduced access to
advice, service and products for retirement savers”). Preliminary studies of a somewhat different
regulatory reform adopted in the United Kingdom found evidence of a “guidance gap” of 43
million investors who may be unable or willing to obtain professional financial guidance because
of the new regulatory restrictions. ANDREW CLARE CASS CONSULTING, THE GUIDANCE
GAP: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE UK’S POST-RDR SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT LANDSCAPE
1 (2013), http://www.cassknowledge.com/sites/default/files/article-attachments/the-guidance-gap.
pdf [https://perma.cc/QW4Y-K4RV]; see also Andrew Clare, Steve Thomas, Omal Walgama &
Christina Makris, Challenge and Opportunity: The Impact of the RDR on the UK’s
Market for Financial Advice 16 (Cass Bus. Sch. & BNY Mellon, Draft No. 4, 2013), http://
www.cassknowledge.com/sites/default/files/article-attachments/bny-mellon-rdr-cass-knowledge.
pdf [https://perma.cc/YP6G-CTXP] (concluding that the regulatory initiative will result in a focus
on high value clients and thus decrease the number of overall advisors). UK regulators conducted
a review and issued recommendations aimed at addressing this guidance gap. HM
TREASURY FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FINANCIAL ADVICE MARKET REVIEW: FINAL REPORT
(2016), https://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/financial-advice-market-review-final-report
[https://perma.cc/FAA4-A2T4].

FISCH, WILKINSON-RYAN & FIRTH IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/28/2016 7:19 PM

648

[Vol. 66:633

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

the provision of investment advice82—the DOL adopting release
explains, “[T]he fact that employers do not generally receive
compensation in connection with their educational communications
provides employers with a high level of confidence that their
educational activities would not constitute investment advice under the
rule.”83
Despite the carve-out for investor education, the fiduciary rule
will increase the costs of providing investment advice in connection
with retirement plans. The effect of reduced access on ordinary
investors and their ability to make appropriate investment decisions is
unclear. As one report shows, the majority of retail investors seek
professional advice for
savings plans.84 There is also evidence that individuals with access
to a financial advisor are better long-term investors.85 There are many
reasons for this, but one possibility is that professional advice bridges
the knowledge gap between ordinary investors and professional
advisors. This Article explores this knowledge gap.
II. STUDY DESIGN AND FINANCIAL LITERACY INDEX
A. Study Participants
We conducted our study with two separate groups. Our first group
consisted of people who signed up through Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk) to participate in internet-based research for compensation.86
In all, 146 MTurk subjects participated in the study.87 We report
demographic information on the full group in Table 1.

82. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–.21(b)(iv) (2015).
83. Employee Benefits Security Administration, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946, 20,976 (Apr. 8, 2016)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550).
84. WYMAN, INC., supra note 20, at 6.
85. Id.; see also VANGUARD, THE VALUE OF MANAGED ACCOUNT ADVICE 1
(2015), http://institutional.vanguard.com/iam/pdf/VMAPRES.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JBN-9M58]
(finding that six of ten long-term retirement investors increased their savings by using professional
advice).
86. See Fisch & Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 1, at 631–32 (describing MTurk).
87. We began with an MTurk “HIT” requesting 150 participants. In Qualtrics, our survey
software, we received 150 fully completed surveys and 22 partially completed surveys. We
removed the data for completed surveys that did not match a submitted MTurk HIT ID, partially
completed surveys, and completed surveys that had an ID or IP address that matched a partially
completed survey, which resulted in our final count of 146 participants. All participant data
removals were chosen based only on this information and completed before and independent of
any data analysis.
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Table 1. MTurk Respondents’ Demographic Variables
Male

58%

Median Age

33

Four Year College Degree or m=More

55%

Employed Full or Part Time

66%

Annual Household Income <$50,000

55%

Our second group consisted of professional advisors. With the
cooperation of FINRA, we made our survey available to employees of
FINRA firms on a voluntary basis. The survey was accessible through
the FINRA compliance website via a link labeled “Participate–
Wharton Investment Strategies Study.”
We received responses from sixty professional advisors.88 Each of
these advisors was either a registered investment advisor, a registered
representative (broker), or both. We report demographic information
on the professional advisors in Table 2 below.
Table 2. FINRA Respondents’ Demographic Variables
Male

79%

Median Age

46

Four Year College Degree or More

96%

Median Time on Survey

23 minutes

Median Number Funds Invested In

4

Although we attempted to make the MTurk and professionaladvisor tasks as similar as possible, there are multiple reasons these
groups are not directly comparable. They received the survey at slightly
different times.89 The instructions were about giving advice to a
hypothetical client (the advisors) instead of about how to make
personal allocations (the MTurk subjects). Most of the individuals who
accessed the survey via MTurk completed the survey, whereas many
advisors only looked at the survey instructions or completed the
allocation without finishing the task.90 Thus, the advisors who did
88. We included all survey responses that were fully completed. We did not include eightytwo additional surveys were only partially completed. (Twenty-two of these completed the
allocation, but not the following questionnaire. The remainder did not complete even the
allocation.)
89. The advisor responses were gathered between February and September of 2015. The
MTurk responses were gathered in November of 2015.
90. See supra note 88.
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complete the survey may be especially interested in volunteering to
perform this kind of task. Despite these differences, we still believe this
study provides insight by making cautious comparisons about how the
two groups approach the task of retirement investing, their choices,
and their knowledge levels. Nonetheless, we offer these cautious
comparisons between the groups in order to suggest the effect of
knowledge and expertise on investment strategies.
B. Study Design
We examined financial literacy in the context of a specific
investment decision—choosing investments in a 401(k) plan. Drawing
upon our prior work, we constructed a web-based interface that
allowed subjects to allocate a hypothetical ten thousand dollars among
ten investment options as part of a 401(k) plan. The MTurk subjects
were told to assume that they were not going to retire for at least thirty
years and that an algorithm would simulate their portfolio’s value at
the end of thirty years based on their investment choices. They were
incentivized to maximize the value of their portfolio by being told that
at the end of the study they would be paid a percentage of their
portfolio’s value at year thirty.
For the professional advisors, we slightly revised the study
instructions to ask the subjects to allocate ten thousand dollars on
behalf of a hypothetical single client thirty years old, with no children,
a lower-middle-class income, and no substantial outside savings or
investments. The professional advisors were not paid for completing
the study. They saw the portfolio’s total value at the end of thirty years
on the final page of the survey.
We offered the subjects ten investment options that included a
bank savings account, a money market fund, and eight domestic mutual
funds (a target-date fund, two fixed-income funds, two equity index
funds, and three actively managed equity funds). Each of the options
was modeled upon a real-world example. We provided our subjects
with an allocation page that contained a list of all ten funds and their
fund category.
The study offered the subjects the opportunity to obtain more
detailed information by user-initiated clicking through a series of links.
Clicking on a fund name provided the subject with a brief description
of the fund and four additional links labeled performance, holdings,
risk, and fees, as shown in Figure 1 below. Clicking any of the four links
revealed simplified fund-specific information derived from the
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attributes of the real-world analog on which the fund was based. The
click-through structure allowed us to track the precise information
accessed by each subject.
Figure 1.

After our subjects completed the allocation exercise, we asked
them to answer a series of questions to assess their attitudes about
investing, their objectives while completing their allocation, their
financial literacy, and to collect demographic information.91 The
MTurk subjects and professional advisors were given the same
investment alternatives and asked to answer the same questionnaire
following their allocation decision.92
At the end of the questionnaire we calculated a predicted value of
the selected portfolio.93 To simulate the performance of each of the
investment options, we used a predetermined algorithm that relied on
basic assumptions about the long-term return for each asset class and
adjusted those returns to reflect the quoted fees of each of the options
in our menu.94 The value of a subject’s portfolio was heavily influenced
91. We describe the financial literacy analysis in more detail below.
92. We asked the subject pools slightly different employment questions. We asked the
professional advisors for information about their current role and their time in the financial
industry, whereas we asked the MTurk subjects about their employment status.
93. The value of a subject’s portfolio was only disclosed to that subject after the subject
completed the study. Professional advisors saw the value on the final page of the survey they
completed; the MTurk subjects saw the value at the conclusion of the full study.
94. Our algorithm calculated returns according to asset class and provided similar returns
for all funds within a single asset class, based on the theory that, over time, a fund is likely to
revert to the market rate of return. We then adjusted each fund’s return to reflect the disclosed
fee, so that funds with higher fees yielded lower returns. Our algorithm provided subjects with
higher payouts for choosing equity over fixed income (the equity risk premium) and with higher
payouts for choosing funds with lower fees. See, e.g., Paul A. Merriman, The Best Investment
Advice Ever, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 5, 2014, 1:13 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/thebest-investment-advice-ever-2014-06-11 [https://perma.cc/2BQ5-WUKN] (discussing the equity
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by the subject’s investment decisions. A portfolio that was invested 100
percent in the FDIC-insured bank account would have had a value of
$13,478.49 at the end of the thirty-year period. A portfolio that was
invested 100 percent in our low-cost equity index fund would have had
a value of $132,676.78. Accordingly, our subjects’ investment choices
determined the value of their portfolios, and (for the MTurk subjects)
their own incentive payment, and the difference between the worst
choice and the best was an order of magnitude.
We evaluated our subjects’ performance in the allocation exercise
in several different ways as described below. Significantly, we were
interested in a number of aspects of the decisionmaking process,
including the information accessed by our subjects, their ability to
compare alternative investment options, and their effort to minimize
fees.
Financial literacy is not, of course, the only factor that is likely to
influence the quality of a subject’s investment decisions. To address the
role of other factors, we collected demographic data as well as
information on education, income, and investment experience.
Prompted by findings from our earlier work, we also considered the
role of risk tolerance.95 Policymakers and the media have highlighted
the billions of dollars of “lost returns” investors sacrifice by paying
excessive fees, but because higher equity exposure is associated with
increased returns,96 those losses are potentially dwarfed by the revenue
sacrificed by excessive risk aversion.
Although economists often treat risk preferences as stable, we
hypothesize that retail investors may be limited in their ability to
evaluate risk and that increased financial literacy or professional advice
may play a role in increasing investor risk tolerance. We therefore
explore the role of risk tolerance independently by asking subjects to

risk premium). Given the thirty-year time frame of the study, we did not reduce the value of
portfolios that incorporated a higher level of risk, recognizing that the literature on the
appropriate level of risk for investments with a long time horizon is complex. See, e.g., Christian
Gollier & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Horizon Length and Portfolio Risk, 24 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 195, 196 (2002) (noting that the degree to which the investment horizon should
affect the riskiness of one’s investment is a “key question” that remains “unresolved”).
95. See Fisch & Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 1, at 645 (observing that results from an earlier
study suggested that study participants had a poor understanding of the objectives behind
retirement investing).
96. See generally IAN AYRES & BARRY NALEBUFF, LIFECYCLE INVESTING: A NEW, SAFE,
AND AUDACIOUS WAY TO IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE OF YOUR RETIREMENT PORTFOLIO
(2010) (describing how the leveraged investments increase portfolio returns).
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answer a question about the extent to which minimizing risk was a high
priority.
C. The Financial Literacy Index
We measured financial literacy in several ways. We developed a
series of nineteen questions about financial knowledge, based on
refinements from a fifteen-question index that we tested in a prior
MTurk study.97 Our questions explore the difference and attributes of
stocks, bonds, and mutual funds as well as the expected long-term
performance of equity and fixed income and the meaning of
diversification. The questions varied in complexity and were designed
to test financial knowledge that is specific to the asset-allocation
decision.98
We also included four questions that tested subject numeracy.99
Finally, we included the three questions used by Lusardi and Mitchell
to test financial literacy. We report the responses to the financial
literacy questions in Table 3 below.

97. See Jill E. Fisch, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Kristin Firth, Investor Financial Literacy in the
Workplace 15–23 (Univ. of Pa. Faculty Scholarship Working Paper No. 1590, 2015),
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2591&context=faculty_scholarship
[https://perma.cc/SLN9-MGZC] (reporting results from use of the fifteen-point index).
98. To evaluate the reliability of our nineteen-question scale, we calculated Cronbach’s
Alpha. Cronbach’s Alpha calculates the correlation of items in a survey and is one measure of the
survey’s reliability. See L.J. Cronbach, Coefficient Alpha and the Internal Structure of Tests, 16
PSYCHOMETRIKA 297, 297 (1951) (developing and defending Cronbach’s alpha as a measure of
reliability). For the nineteen-point scale, Cronbach’s alpha is 0.72, which is in the range of what is
considered reliable. See, e.g., Mohsen Tavakol & Reg Dennick, Making Sense of Cronbach’s
Alpha, 2 INT’L J. MED. EDUC. 53, 54 (2011) (noting that different reports suggest an acceptable
value of Cronbach’s alpha is between .70 and .95).
99. We test numeracy using four questions about the effect of compounding and
incorporating increasing degrees of complexity.
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Table 3. Quiz Performance, by Item, for Each Subject Pool

Question

MTurk
Percent
Correct

FINRA
Percent
Correct

MC1: Best returns from stocks

63%

98%

MC2: Stock = own part of company

89%

98%

MC3: Bond = lend money to company

80%

98%

MC4: Safest bond is treasury

87%

100%

MC5: Interest rates go up, bond prices go down

52%

100%

MC6: Mutual funds pool with other investors

73%

100%

MC7: Fund balanced for retirement fund is target-date
fund

53%

100%

MC8: Relationship between risk and returns in long run
is positive

48%

73%

MC9: Longer time horizon, take on more risk

69%

100%

TF10: Index fund tracks market index

90%

98%

TF11: Possible to lose money in bond

61%

100%

TF12: Professional managed funds do better

31%

70%

TF13: Index funds vary based on manager experience

35%

68%

TF14: Possible to lose money in mutual fund

89%

100%

TF15: Expenses do not vary among mutual funds

78%

98%

TF16: Diversification reduces variability

44%

67%

TF17: Difference between bank and money market is
FDIC insurance

74%

82%

TF18: Mutual funds less diversified than individual stocks

78%

97%

TF19: Target dates cheaper than individual funds

30%

46%

N1: Return in 2 years

61%

78%

N2: Return in 30 years

38%

75%

N3: Fees paid in 30 years

42%

50%

N4: Fees paid in 30 years

35%

42%

LM1: Compounding

90%

98%

LM2: Inflation and Savings

84%

98%

LM3: Safety of Stocks vs. Mutual Funds

80%

96%

Mean 19-point score

12.3

16.9

Mean Numeracy Score

1.8

2.4

Mean LM score

2.5

2.9

Note: MC – multiple choice, TF – true false, N – numeracy, LM – Lusardi & Mitchell questions.
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As expected, the table indicates that on every measure the
professional advisors are more financially literate than the MTurk
subjects. We found relatively little variance in the level of financial
literacy among the professional advisors. Across the board, our
professional subjects answered virtually all of the financial literacy
questions accurately, generating a correct response rate of about 90
percent, as opposed to the MTurk subjects who answered correctly
only about 65 percent of the time on a true–false and multiple-choice
test. All but one of the professional advisors scored fourteen or higher
on the nineteen-question scale. Only three of our sixty professional
advisors got any of the Lusardi and Mitchell questions wrong. We turn,
in the next Part, to exploring the implications of that knowledge gap by
examining the relationship between financial literacy and investment
performance.
III. STUDY RESULTS
A. Financial Literacy and Investment Performance
Our first objective was to evaluate the role of financial literacy in
investment performance. To analyze the effect of financial literacy, we
divided the MTurk sample into two groups—high- and low-literacy
subjects—based on their performance on our nineteen-point literacy
scale. The dividing line was at the median score of thirteen. Subjects
with a financial literacy score of less than thirteen were categorized as
low literacy and those getting thirteen or more items correct were
categorized as high literacy. Table 4 provides more detail on the two
groups. Note that the median literacy level in the high-literacy MTurk
group equaled the bottom score (except for one outlier) of the entire
professional-advisor subject pool:
Table 4. MTurk Financial Literacy by Group
Min.

First
Quartile

Median

Mean

Third
Quartile

Max.

Lowliteracy
MTurk

6.0

9.0

10.0

10.07

11.0

12.0

Highliteracy
MTurk

13.0

13.0

14.0

14.54

15.25

18.0

As noted above, we evaluated our subjects’ performance in the
allocation exercise in several different ways. First, because we
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instructed our subjects to maximize the size of their hypothetical
retirement portfolio, we looked at the degree to which their success
was correlated with financial literacy. Because we constructed an
algorithm that calculated portfolio value and because that algorithm
depended on certain assumptions about asset allocation and return, we
were concerned that the constructed portfolio value did not reflect a
sufficiently objective measure of decisionmaking quality.
We therefore considered several alternative metrics for evaluating
performance. One of these was the amount invested by our subjects in
Fund D, the low-cost index fund.100 Based on the information provided
to our subjects, Fund D was designed to dominate the other investment
options over every dimension except risk.101 The study thus captures
the viewpoint seemingly reflected by current DOL policy that, for the
average investor, the most appropriate equity option is a low-cost
passively managed fund.102
Much commentary focuses on the role of disclosure in improving
investor performance.103 A persistent question in this literature
concerns the degree to which investors search for and use the
information that is available to them.104 To address this concern, our
study design requires our subjects to click on a link to access each
specific piece of information about the investment alternatives. The
web interface enabled us to track every piece of information that a
subject accessed. Because subjects could only identify relevant fund
characteristics by clicking on the links, we treat the number of clicks as
another outcome variable, reasoning that only investors who obtained
the information that was provided could distinguish among the
100. We consider in more detail below our subjects’ choice among the ten investment
alternatives.
101. We consider risk separately, as discussed below.
102. See, e.g., Matt Levine, Labor Department Wants to Tweak Your Retirement
Plan, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Apr. 15, 2015, 3:43 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/
2015-04-15/labor-department-wants-to-tweak-your-retirement-plan [https://perma.cc/85MS-M8
BQ] (describing the DOL’s “bias toward passive investing”).
103. See, e.g., Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S–K, 81 Fed. Reg.
23,916, 23,917 (Apr. 22, 2016) (soliciting input on whether the existing disclosures mandated by
Regulation S–K “continue to provide the information that investors need to make informed
investment and voting decisions”).
104. See, e.g., John Beshears, James J. Choi, David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, How Does
Simplified Disclosure Affect Individuals’ Mutual Fund Choices?, in EXPLORATIONS IN THE
ECONOMICS OF AGING 75, 76–77 (David A. Wise ed., 2011) (reporting study results finding that
providing a fund’s Summary Prospectus does not affect portfolio choices); Kristina Rennekamp,
Processing Fluency and Investors’ Reactions to Disclosure Readability, 50 J. ACCT. RES. 1319, 1343
(2012) (finding that investors respond more to readable disclosures).
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investment alternatives. A similar proxy is provided by the amount of
time our subjects spent on the exercise.105 Finally, incorporating our
earlier research on the importance of fees,106 we also considered the
average fees paid by our subjects.107
Table 5 reports the differences among subject groups. Financial
literacy was highly associated with performance. The high-literacy
MTurk subjects selected portfolios that were worth an average of
$21,000 more than the low-literacy MTurk subjects. Similarly, the
professional advisors generated portfolios worth an average of 20
percent more than those of the MTurk subjects, a difference that
translates into an average of more than $16,000 on a $10,000 initial
investment. Most starkly, the professional advisors selected portfolios
that were worth about $27,000 more than the low-literacy MTurk
subjects, a difference of 33 percent.
Table 5. Outcome Variables by Group

Returns
Cheap Index Fund
Investment

Low Literacy

High Literacy

Professional
Advisors

70,389.78

91,575.08

97,166.02

t=5.94, df=142.5, p<.001
8.1

t=2.97, df=139, p=0.004

27.5
t=1.92, df=116, p=0.058

.69

t=3.09, df=104.7, p=0.003
17.9

Total Clicks

19.3

t=4.14, df=84.2, p<.001
.77

Fees Paid108

t=1.67, df=127.7, p=0.097

.63
t=1.45, df=124.8, p=0.15

29.0

25.6
t=0.74, df=118.7, p=0.462

Financial literacy was also associated with our other outcome
variables. The financially literate subjects allocated more money to the
cheap index fund, paid lower fees, and accessed more information in
connection with the allocation decision as measured by number of
105. Because of design limitations in the survey format, time is a noisy variable, both because
our subjects could have been doing other things during the survey and because, for the MTurk
subjects, the MTurk structure included a time limit after which the study expired, preventing
subjects who spent too long from completing the survey.
106. See Fisch & Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 1, at 638–39.
107. Because our study did not charge a fee for the bank account, it was possible to minimize
fees by investing exclusively in the bank account.
108. To calculate fees paid, we omitted the cash account.
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clicks. Our professional advisors outperformed the high-literacy
MTurk subjects along those dimensions as well except for clicks.109
These differences could be explained by factors other than
financial literacy. Indeed, an extensive literature looks at the role of
various demographic factors as well as experience in predicting
investment performance. We explore the role of these factors in two
ways. First, we ran a regression to explore the relationship between
demographic characteristics and financial literacy. The results are
shown in Table 6 below:
Table 6. Regression: DV=FL Score 19

Experience Score
(1)

Demographics
(2)

Experience Score
and Demographics
(3)

Intercept

12.26***
(0.21)

11.44***
(0.33)

11.48***
(0.32)

Experience

0.85***
(0.21)

0.64**
(0.22)

Age

0.48*
(0.22)

0.41
(0.21)

Male

1.35**
(0.44)

1.3**
(0.42)

Education

0.66**
(0.23)

0.56*
(0.22)

Income

0.09
(0.23)

-0.1
(0.23)

0.114

0.158

F(4,139)=5.61

F(5,138)=6.37

<.001

<.001

Adjusted R2
F-Test
p-value

0.092
F(1,145)=15.83
<.001

n=144. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 All noncategorical independent variables have been
scaled by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation.

As Table 6 shows, financial literacy is associated with gender
(males are more financially literate) and investment experience, and is
somewhat correlated with education. These findings are predictable
and consistent with the existing literature.110
109. The difference in clicks may be explained by the professional advisors’ greater familiarity
with the task.
110. See, e.g., Annamaria Lusardi, What’s Behind the Financial Literacy Gender Gap?, WALL
STREET J.: THE EXPERTS (Nov. 2, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2015/11/02/whats-
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Results from our earlier research suggest the independent
importance of risk tolerance in investing behavior. We analyze risk
tolerance in this study using a self-reported seven-point scale of
agreement with the statement that minimizing risk was an important
priority (reverse coded so that a higher number is a higher risk
tolerance).
Table 7. Risk and Financial Literacy

Mean Risk Tolerance

Low Literacy

High Literacy

2.6

3.7

Professional
Advisors
3.8

Overall, the MTurk subjects indicated a lower risk tolerance than
the FINRA subjects, and risk tolerance was associated with financial
literacy. The two variables are highly correlated (r=.35) and the
difference on risk score between low- and high-literacy MTurk
participants is highly significant (t=4.1, p=.000). Risk tolerance was not
different between high-literacy subjects and professional advisors.
We refine this analysis by running a basic regression in which our
dependent variable is financial performance, measured by portfolio
value. We include financial literacy demographic controls, and controls
for risk tolerance and the numeracy score.

behind-the-financial-literacy-gender-gap [https://perma.cc/4MUF-9LZ] (reporting study results
showing that there is a persistent gender gap in financial literacy).

FISCH, WILKINSON-RYAN & FIRTH IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/28/2016 7:19 PM

660

[Vol. 66:633

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

Table 8. Regression: DV=Return
FL Score and
Demographics

Intercept
FL Score 19

All Scores and
Demographics

FL Score
(1)

(2)

(3)

80766.3***
(1770.4)

81050.8***
(2825.2)

81003.4***
(2679.8)

11065***
(1776.4)

10797.7***
(1949.3)

7034.8**
(2094.3)
2519.3
(1815.1)

Numeracy Score
Risk Score

8208.6***
(1836.3)

Experience

948.4
(1908)

Age

-578.1
(1868.6)

-1237.8
(1815.3)

Male

-52.6
(3824.3)

-706.6
(3619.4)

2860.6
(1978.6)

2115.1
(1918.7)

530.4
(1921)

947.2
(1907.9)

0.206

0.21

0.305

F-Test

F(1,145)=38.8

F(5,138)=8.62

F(8,132)=8.67

p-value

<.001

<.001

<.001

Education
Income
Adjusted R2

n=144. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 All noncategorical independent variables have been
scaled by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation.

As Table 8 shows, financial literacy is a strong predictor of better
performance on the experimental task as measured in simulated
returns on investment, holding the demographic variables constant. In
other words, financial literacy is not just a function of gender,
investment experience, or risk tolerance. Additionally, although
numeracy—the ability to solve math problems related to investing,
specifically compounding—is highly correlated with financial
literacy,111 numeracy is not independently predictive of success in
111. As expected, our independent variables are highly correlated with one another. Our
financial literacy score is also highly correlated with the LM-literacy score. In unreported
regressions, we find that both indices have independent explanatory power. This data is on file
with the Duke Law Journal.
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navigating the investment choices. When other variables are accounted
for, numeracy has no relationship to investment decisions. Finally, for
the MTurk subjects, risk attitude was one of the most significant
predictors of performance even after accounting for financial literacy
more generally. Table 8 shows that higher risk tolerance is associated
with a significant increase in returns in the investment task even
holding financial literacy constant.
We note that the relationship between risk tolerance and
investment performance is predictable—the equity risk premium
historically has compensated investors for their willingness to bear
additional risk. In the context of retirement savings, the effects are
compounded. As a result, risk aversion is likely to penalize investors
substantially. This finding is consistent with the responses of the
professional advisors, who noted that the equity risk premium coupled
with the long-term nature of the investment counseled in favor of a
substantial exposure to equity.
Generally speaking, the professional advisors had financial
literacy scores that were uniformly high with little differentiation or
predictive power. We did separately analyze the group we call the
“uber-high” respondents, all of whom scored either eighteen or
nineteen on the nineteen-point scale. They had marginally significant
higher returns by our measure of returns (t=1.80, p=.081) and paid
noticeably less in fees, averaging fifty basis points rather than sixty-nine
(t=2.69, p=.013). One advantage of using a more fine-grained financial
literacy measure is that it permits us to differentiate meaningfully even
within a largely homogenous population.
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B. Asset-Allocation Analysis
Table 9 shows the allocation of funds for each subject group.
Table 9. Asset Allocation, MTurk and FINRA, Means and Medians

Fund (fee)

MTurk Low
Literacy

MTurk High
Literacy

FINRA

A: Target-Date Fund (.89%)

11.4 [10]

12.8 [5]

17.8 [10]

B: Fixed-Income Fund (.89%)

9.8 [8]

4.7 [0]

5.1 [0]

C: Fixed-Income Fund (.22%)

10.9 [10]

9.4 [5]

6.1 [0]

D: Cheap Index Fund (.17%)

8 [10]

19.3 [10]

27.5 [20]

E: Dominated Index Fund (.67%)

7.1 [7]

10.6 [8]

11.1 [0]

F: Managed Fund (.67%)

7.8 [10]

10.7 [10]

12.3 [10]

G: Expensive Managed Fund (1.25%)

11.5 [10]

13.6 [10]

10.2 [5]

H: Managed Fund (.62%) (closet
index)

10.4 [10]

11.4 [10]

7 [0]

I: Money Market (.16%)

12 [5]

3.9 [0]

1.6 [0]

J: Cash (no fee)

11.1 [9]

3.5 [0]

1.3 [0]

Note: Means are the first number in each cell. Medians are provided in square brackets.

As noted above, one of the challenges in evaluating retirement
investing is setting an appropriate benchmark—that is, normatively
evaluating a given investment strategy. To limit this concern, our study
focuses largely on asset-allocation decisions and on our subjects’ ability
to make rational allocation decisions without seeking to identify which
choices are necessarily optimal. We consider three aspects of the
allocation decision: diversification, investment in dominated funds, and
investment in cash and cash equivalents.
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1. Diversification. In prior research, we found evidence of naive
diversification.112 Subjects did not appear to “pick [the best] funds” but
instead spread their investment across the full range of alternatives.113
We observed variation in this pattern, however, and flagged the
question of what investor characteristics explained naive
diversification as a subject for future study.114 In this project we
explored the question in more detail.
As Figures 2–4 demonstrate, our investor groups differed
dramatically with respect to the extent to which they engaged in naive
diversification. The low-literacy MTurk subjects invested in an average
of 7.2 funds, and fully 44 percent of them invested in all ten funds. At
the extreme, twenty-one of the MTurk subjects invested 10 percent of
their portfolio in each of the ten options.
Figure 2. Low-Literacy MTurk Subjects, Percent of Subjects Investing
in Each Number of Funds
Low-Literacy MTurk Investments - Number of Funds
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112. Naive diversification or confused diversification involves using a simple rule of thumb,
such as the 1/n heuristic, rather than diversifying in accordance with maximizing a particular utility
function. See Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Naive Diversification Strategies in Defined
Contribution Saving Plans, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 79, 79 (2001) (explaining the concept of naive
diversification).
113. Fisch & Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 1, at 636.
114. Id.
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The high-literacy MTurk subjects invested in far fewer funds as
shown in Figure 3. The average number of funds they invested in was
4.8, and only 15 percent invested in all ten fund options.
Figure 3. High-Literacy MTurk Subjects, Percent of Subjects Investing
in Each Number of Funds
High-Literacy MTurk Investments - Number of Funds
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The professional advisors were even more selective as shown in
Figure 4. They invested in an average of 4.3 funds, and only 5 percent
(three subjects) invested in all ten funds. Not one of the professional
advisors engaged in the 1/10 investment strategy of allocating 10
percent of their portfolio to each of the ten investment options. All
these differences are highly significant.

FISCH, WILKINSON-RYAN & FIRTH IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

11/28/2016 7:19 PM

RETIREMENT INVESTING

665

Figure 4. FINRA Subjects, Percent of Subjects Investing in Each
Number of Funds
Professional Advisors Investments - Number of Funds
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Unlike the MTurk subjects, the professional advisors appeared to
recognize that the allocation task involved evaluating the relative
merits of the allocation options. Several of the professional advisors
specifically identified the duplication among the fund options and
made a clear decision to choose the better among similar
alternatives.115 As discussed below, our fund menu in this study
contained dominated funds that investors should have rejected in favor
of alternatives. Accordingly, naive diversification reduced investor
returns.
2. Dominated Funds. In their responses, the professional advisors
highlighted the importance of asset allocation in retirement planning.
Our study was designed, in a simplified way, to test the extent to which
subjects were making intelligent asset-allocation choices. The most
explicit test of asset allocation was our inclusion of two S&P 500 index
funds that were identical in every dimension except fees.116

115. As one subject explained: “2 funds seemed enough as F, G & H look the same as do B &
C and D & E.” (survey on file with the authors).
116. The reported past performance of the high-cost index fund was also lower, reflecting the
cost associated with the higher fee.
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We found substantial differences among our investors. Overall,
the differences corresponded to financial literacy; 63 percent of the
high-literacy MTurk subjects invested nothing in the expensive index
fund, but only 27 percent of low-literacy MTurk subjects invested zero.
Oddly, 42 percent of FINRA subjects invested some amount of their
portfolio in the expensive index fund, perhaps because they were
choosing by category rather than cost. Those who invested in the
dominated index fund were largely subjects who had not clicked on the
fees button at all.
We presented our subjects with two additional dominated funds.
One dominated fund was a closet index fund—a fund that purported
to be actively managed and charged a corresponding fee—which had
holdings and returns that were virtually identical to those of the index
funds.117 The other dominated fund was a fixed-income fund that
dominated the other fixed-income fund in terms of risk, fees, and past
performance, although, because the funds were modeled upon realworld options, the holdings of the two were not identical.
In both cases, the FINRA subjects were better than the MTurk
subjects at identifying the dominated funds, although the FINRA
subjects did not avoid those funds entirely. Approximately 63 percent
of the FINRA subjects invested nothing in the closet index fund,
compared to 33 percent of the MTurk subjects. Similarly 44 percent of
the MTurk subjects invested nothing in the dominated fixed-income
fund, and 67 percent of the FINRA subjects invested zero in that fund.
These findings are only suggestive at this point, because there are
multiple possible explanations for failure to invest in any given fund.
But the first look does suggest a kind of menu effect that has been
identified in work on the subject of choice architecture and that should
be of concern to regulators.118 As we discuss further below, the
implication of this finding may be a need for enhanced employer
obligations with respect to plan design. Specifically, the current
regulatory emphasis on maximizing employee choice among

117. See Fisch, supra note 13, at 2018 (explaining closet index funds).
118. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 3 (2008) (explaining the concept of choice
architecture); Olivia S. Mitchell, Gary R. Mottola, Stephen P. Utkus & Takeshi Yamaguchi,
Default, Framing and Spillover Effects: The Case of Lifecycle Funds in 401(k) Plans 17
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 15108, 2009), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w15108.pdf [https://perma.cc/P92T-Q6XF] (evaluating the introduction of target-date
funds into the menu of retirement plans and finding that “expected default and framing effects[]
can also have important unanticipated or spillover effects”).
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investment alternatives may not provide employees with sufficient
protection.
C. Risk Aversion and Equity Allocation
As noted above, we found that risk aversion played a substantial
role in explaining differences in the value of our subjects’ portfolios.
This result was, in part, a product of the fact that our valuation
algorithm reflected a substantial risk premium. Our theory was that,
over a thirty-year time horizon, investors are compensated for bearing
the risk associated with equities and penalized, in terms of
performance, for allocating their investments primarily into cash.119
Additionally, because we offered investors a low-cost fixed-income
fund option (and a target-date fund), even those investors who sought
to minimize the risk of their portfolios had an investment alternative
that should have dominated the cash and money market fund
options.120 Within the framework of this study, we therefore viewed
substantial allocations to both the cash and money market alternatives
as costly mistakes.
We found a dramatic difference between our subject groups with
respect to this allocation choice as shown in Table 10 below.
Table 10. Mean Investment Level – Cash and Money Market
Fund
I: Money Market
J: Cash

Low-Literacy
MTurk
12.0
11.1

High-literacy
MTurk
4.0
3.5

Professional Advisors
1.6
1.3

The allocation differences were consistent in our subjects’
understandings of the investment task. We asked all our subjects
several open-ended questions designed to capture their intended
investment strategy. Our professional-advisor subjects overwhelmingly
both considered the allocation of their portfolio between debt and
equity as an important consideration and, in considering that
allocation, chose to invest the majority of the portfolio in equity—an
119. See, e.g., J. Bradford DeLong & Konstantin Magin, The U.S. Equity Return Premium:
Past, Present, and Future, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 195 (2009) (observing an average historical
equity risk premium of approximately 5 percent for investors with a twenty-year time horizon
since 1901).
120. In the real world, investors might allocate a percentage of their portfolio to cash to take
advantage of future buying opportunities. Because investors in our study were not permitted to
make adjustments to their portfolios after the initial allocation, this motivation for allocating
assets to cash should have been eliminated.
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average of 80 percent.121 In support of this decision, they cited the long
time frame over which the money would be invested and the historic
equity premium. The high-literacy MTurk subjects provided a similar
explanation stating that to maximize growth, a substantial investment
in equity was required and that thirty years provided sufficient time to
“ride out the storm.” In contrast, the low-literacy MTurk subjects
described their investment objective in terms of safety and stability
and, significantly, did not even address the applicable time horizon.
The DOL has already shifted its regulatory approach to provide a
nudge in favor of increased equity investing by, for example,
authorizing employers to provide a target-date fund as a default
option.122 Employers are not, however, compelled to do so; nor are they
required to advise investors of the potential returns that they may
sacrifice in an effort to minimize the riskiness of their portfolios. Our
results highlight the potential cost of this policy as well as the value that
may be realized through increasing investor risk tolerance.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
We document the importance of financial literacy in retirement
investing—limited financial literacy is associated with poor investment
decisionmaking. Importantly, however, we highlight the specific types
of mistakes associated with limited financial literacy—low-literacy
subjects failed even to review the applicable information about their
investment options and, predictably, they engaged in naive
diversification, failed to identify dominated funds, paid higher fees, and
invested too much in cash and cash equivalents. Higher-literacy
subjects, although imperfect, demonstrated far better performance
across all these dimensions. Our results support the findings in prior
research about the importance of financial literacy and offer reasons to
question the viability of participant-directed investing as the primary
vehicle for retirement savings. Whether or not investor performance

121. We considered allocations to the target-date fund, which was described as consisting of
95 percent equity at the time of the study, as an allocation to equity.
122. Congress authorized automatic enrollment in 401(k) plans in the Pension Protection Act
of 2006. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 902, 120 Stat. 780, 1033–39
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 401). The DOL subsequently adopted regulations specifying the types of
investment options that could be used as default options—so called qualified default investment
alternatives (QDIAs). See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-5 (2015). Target-date funds were included as
QDIAs. See Leslie Wayne, Target-Date Mutual Funds May Miss Their Mark, N.Y. TIMES (June
24, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/25/your-money/mutual-funds-and-etfs/25target.html
[https://perma.cc/6V2G-JTFM] (describing the DOL “safe harbor” for target-date funds).
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can be improved through disclosure, investor education, or other
responses—a question we do not address in this study—the limitations
of investors’ ability to protect themselves offer reasons to question the
existing regulatory structure of 401(k) plans. In particular, our findings
call into question the viability of relying on investor choice, in that
investors may not be capable of making appropriate choices.
One implication of our results is the need to consider more
carefully the scope of employer obligations under ERISA. As noted
above, under current law, an employer is largely relieved from
fiduciary responsibility for an employee’s investment decisions as long
as the employer provides a plan that meets a few minimum standards.
At the same time, the law has generally viewed plans that offer a
broader range of investment options more favorably.123
Consistent with other research, our study shows, however, that the
inclusion of inferior options, duplicative options, or simply too many
choices may reduce the quality of employees’ decisions.124 Regulators
may therefore consider requiring employers to undertake greater
efforts to screen the quality of the investment options they offer rather
than simply deferring to investor choice, based on the inability of
investors to screen for themselves. Although the Supreme Court hinted
at the need for greater employer responsibility in Tibble,125 the courts
have generally been reluctant to second-guess an employer or plan
sponsor’s selection of investment options.126 There are good reasons for
this—as noted, the literature does not define the optimal investment
strategy or options for retirement investing with precision, and afterthe-fact scrutiny is invariably subject to hindsight bias.127 Nonetheless,
the performance of both the high-literacy MTurk subjects and the

123. See, e.g., Ayres & Curtis, supra note 18, at 1493 (“[A] menu that offers at least some good
options, like the Hecker menu, will much more likely benefit from the protection of the safe
harbor.”); Fisch & Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 1, at 618–19.
124. See, e.g., Ayres & Curtis, supra note 18; Sheena S. Iyengar & Emir Kamenica, Choice
Proliferation, Simplicity Seeking, and Asset Allocation, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 530, 530–38 (2010).
125. See Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1828 (2015).
126. See Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 746 F.3d 327, 338 (8th Cir. 2014) (vacating the district court’s
finding of liability as reflecting improper “hindsight bias”).
127. See id. (explaining that the plan administrator’s choice of investment options is entitled
to deference because “[w]hile it is easy to pick an investment option in retrospect (buy Apple Inc.
at $7 a share in December 2000 and short Enron Corp. at $90 a share), selecting an investment
beforehand is difficult”).
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professional advisors suggests that more rigorous employer screening
of fund options can eliminate some potential investor mistakes.128
Indeed, an increased focus on this screening function may offer a
valuable mechanism for mediating between the DOL’s concern about
protecting vulnerable investors and the limitations imposed by the
DOL’s strict fiduciary standard. Although the task of identifying the
optimal investing strategy may be difficult, the responses by our
professional-advisor subjects demonstrate a high degree of consensus
about the factors that should inform both retirement-plan design and
investor allocation decisions within a retirement plan. It is plausible
that these factors could be incorporated into a legal standard, such as
that imposed by FINRA’s suitability requirement, that could be
imposed without the onerous liability exposure associated with
expanded fiduciary status. The goal, after all, need not be the best
possible investment decision, but rather reducing avoidable and costly
investment mistakes.
Within this goal, we infer an identifiable value associated with
professional advice. The professional advisors were uniformly sensitive
to the fact that the equity risk premium and the thirty-year time
horizon of the allocation decision warranted substantial equity
exposure—facts that the low-literacy investors seemed to be unaware
of and that were in tension with the risk aversion of that subject group.
Although the academic literature commonly views risk aversion as a
stable preference,129 our study suggests that, at least in the investing
context, some degree of risk aversion may, itself, be a mistake.130
Access to professional advice may address this knowledge gap and
enable low-literacy investors to make better retirement investing

128. See Veronika K. Pool, Clemens Sialm, & Irina Stefanescu, It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual
Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans, 71 J. FIN. 1779, 1781 (2016) (suggesting that 401(k) plan
providers are less likely to eliminate underperforming affiliated funds from plan menus and that
this behavior affects the returns of plan participants).
129. See, e.g., Thomas Dohmen, David Huffman, & Jürgen Schupp, Individual Risk Attitudes:
Measurement, Determinants and Behavioral Consequences, 9 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N. 522, 524
(2011) (“In economics it is common to think of a single trait as governing risk-taking in all
contexts . . . .”).
130. This possibility has long been suggested by studies showing greater risk tolerance by the
wealthy. For an early example, see Richard A. Cohn, Individual Investor Risk Aversion and
Investment Portfolio Composition, 30 J. FIN. 605, 618 (1975) (finding “a strong pattern of
decreasing relative risk aversion”).
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decisions. Our empirical results are consistent with anecdotal evidence
of the value of professional advice.131
This is not to say that the DOL’s concerns about the potential
effect of advisors’ conflicts of interest are unfounded; our study design
does not allow us to capture the potential effect of conflicts of interest
on real-world advice.132 Moreover, even in the absence of problematic
fee structures or other incentives, our professional advisors were not
infallible: in some cases, their decisions were no better than those of
the high-literacy MTurk subjects. Nonetheless, our study highlights the
potential value of professional advice in enabling low-literacy
investors, those most disadvantaged by a participant-directed model,
to make more appropriate allocation decisions. Continued research is
necessary to explore the extent to which the benefits from sound
retirement investing outweigh the costs associated with professional
advice.
CONCLUSION
Participant-directed retirement-savings plans are now the norm,
but participants often lack the time and expertise to optimize their
investment choices. As a result, investors make costly mistakes.
Understanding the obstacles to better investment strategies is critical
for the future financial independence of today’s workers.
We have shed light on some of the reasons for poor investor
decisionmaking. Primarily, we show that retail investors lack basic
financial literacy and that financial literacy is a strong predictor of
investment outcomes.
We also document a striking knowledge gap that is reflected in
substantial performance differences. Our study demonstrates lowliteracy investors make certain types of predictable mistakes that have
substantial consequences for investment returns. Employers, through

131. See, e.g., Merriman, supra note 94 (stating that “[e]very DALBAR study that’s been
released” suggests that “investors who use professional investment advice achieve higher longterm returns than those who make their own decisions”).
132. The debate about the existence and effect of advisor conflicts of interest is beyond the
scope of this Article. Because investors compensate their advisors and, because any compensation
structure creates incentives, the real regulatory challenge is to create a compensation structure
that most effectively aligns the interests of advisor and investor. See, e.g., Andrew Osterland, Is
Your Financial Advisor Really Putting You Before Profit?, CNBC (Sept. 8, 2015, 8:00 AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/04/is-your-financial-advisor-really-putting-you-before-profit.html
[https://perma.cc/YZ9J-VKKZ] (explaining how various common compensation structures can
create conflicts of interest).

FISCH, WILKINSON-RYAN & FIRTH IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/28/2016 7:19 PM

672

[Vol. 66:633

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

better plan design, and professional advisors, by encouraging lowliteracy investors to increase their risk tolerance, can mitigate some of
the mistakes investors commonly make in retirement investing.
Professional advice may also reduce investors’ discomfort with the
decisionmaking process and lead to higher levels of participation and
investment.

